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Note
Reverse-Spreigl Evidence: Challenging
Defendants' Obligation to Exceed
Prosecutorial Standards to Admit Evidence
of Third Party Guilt
Jayna M. Mathieu*
After midnight on July 27, 1994, William Gumtow shot and
killed Todd Goodwin.' The two men, tenants in the same Duluth, Minnesota, apartment building, had argued over Goodwin's role in an alleged theft of rent money. 2 Gumtow testified
that Goodwin approached him with a raised hunting knife and

- J.D. Candidate 2003, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1999,
Saint Olaf College. The Author would like to thank Chad Oldfather, Donald
Dripps, Morgan Holcomb, Kara Lundy, and Kristina Carlson for their assistance with this Note. Special thanks to Roger Paquin.
1. State v. Gumtow, No. C4-96-663, 1997 WL 161858, at *1 (Minn. Ct.
App. Apr. 8, 1997). This case introduces the concepts of Spreigl and reverseSpreigl evidence. Spreigl evidence is evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts.
See John D. Becker, Evidence, A Survey of the Important Decisionsof the Minnesota Supreme Court: The 1990-1991 Term, 18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 187,
229 (1992). Although Spreigl incidents often resemble the charged crime, they
only may involve "misconduct other than the misconduct that is the subject of
the trial." Id. The prosecution uses evidence of these prior bad acts to help
establish the defendant's guilt in the charged crime. See State v. Spreigl, 139
N.W.2d 167, 172 (Minn. 1965).
Reverse-Spreigl evidence is evidence of a third party's prior bad acts.
State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Minn. 1997) (en banc) (citing State
v. Johnson, 568 N.W.2d 426 (Minn. 1997) (en banc)). Defendants often introduce reverse-Spreigl evidence to suggest that a third party committed the
charged crime. Id. In this context, reverse-Spreigl evidence helps defendants
cast reasonable doubt on the prosecution's case against them. Id. Defendants
also may use reverse-Spreigl evidence to support their self-defense claims.
State v. Bland, 337 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Minn. 1983) (en banc). They submit evidence of the victim's prior violent acts to strengthen defense arguments that
the victim acted as the aggressor in the charged incident. Id.
2. Gumtow, 1997 WL 161858, at *1.
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that he shot Goodwin in self-defense. 3 To strengthen his case,
Gumtow sought to use Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b) to introduce evidence of Goodwin's prior arrests.4 Under the rule,
defendants seeking to introduce such evidence must connect it
to the charged crime and prove by clear and convincing evidence the third party's involvement in the prior bad act.5
Courts purport to determine the admissibility of this "reverseSpreigl evidence" by the same standard they use for "Spreigl
evidence," proof of the defendant's prior bad acts introduced by
6
the prosecution.
In practice, however, courts tend to reach different results
in Spreigl and reverse-Spreigl cases. 7 Contrary to a Spreigl
scenario, when defendants attempt to introduce reverse-Spreigl
evidence, trial courts frequently exclude it.8 Appellate courts,
which review these determinations for abuse of discretion, 9
generally uphold the decisions.1 0 State v. Gumtow1' is one such
3. Id.
4. Id. For the full text of Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b), see infra
note 40 and accompanying text. The text of the Minnesota Rule is nearly
identical to that of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). See infranote 40.
5. Gumtow, 1997 WL 161858, at *1-2. Minnesota Rule of Evidence
404(b) departs from the corresponding Federal Rule by requiring that defendants prove by clear and convincing evidence the third party's involvement in
the prior bad acts. The Federal Rule only requires a showing by the preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1432 (6th Cir.
1986); see discussion infra note 40.
6. Gumtow, 1997 WL 161858, at *2.
7. See id. at *7 (Randall, J., specially concurring). Judge Randall suggested that the Spreigl and reverse-Spreigl standards are not identically implemented. Id. He noted that prior bad acts evidence is more likely to be admitted if the prosecution enters it against a defendant than if a defendant
introduces it to establish the guilt of a third party. Id. Compare State v. Williams, 593 N.W.2d 227, 233-34 (Minn. 1999) (en banc) (upholding the exclusion
of evidence that the third party made threats and behaved violently due to the
defendant's failure to connect the third party to the charged crime), with State
v. Berry, 484 N.W.2d 14, 18 (Minn. 1992) (en banc) (upholding the admission
into evidence of three prior incidents in which the defendant threatened violence against others). See infra Part C.1 (discussingBerry).
8. See Williams, 593 N.W.2d at 227; State v. Profit, 591 N.W.2d 451, 466
(Minn. 1999) (en banc); State v. Johnson, 568 N.W.2d 426, 434 (Minn. 1997)
(en banc).
9. State v. Robinson, 604 N.W.2d 355, 363 (Minn. 2000) (en banc) ("Admissibility is within the sound discretion of the trial court and the court's ruling will be upheld absent a clear abuse of discretion.").
10. See, e.g., State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 449-50 (Minn. 1997) (en
banc) (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding reverse-Spreigl evidence); see also Johnson, 568 N.W.2d at 434 (holding
that the trial court's exclusion of the defendant's reverse-Spreigl evidence was
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case. The trial court determined that Goodwin's prior arrests
for property damage, disorderly conduct, and assault did not
meet the reverse-Spreigl standard, and therefore were inadmissible to support the defendant's self-defense claim. 12 In a
special concurrence, Judge Randall argued that his work on "a
few hundred" reverse-Spreigl cases leaves him certain that if
the state had offered similar incidents against13the defendant,
the evidence "likely would have been admitted."
This Note will demonstrate that Minnesota's reverseSpreigl standard restricts defendants' Sixth Amendment right
to introduce potentially exculpatory evidence.14 Part I examwithin "a reasonable exercise of the district court's discretion").
11. 1997 WL 161858, at *1.
12. See id. at 1-2.
13. Id. at *7 (Randall, J., specially concurring).
14. The Sixth Amendment provides,
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein
the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST.amend. VI.

In some cases, the reverse-Spreigl standard infringes upon defendants' Sixth Amendment rights by preventing them from "present[ing] reliable
and exculpatory evidence and witnesses." Stephen Michael Everhart, Putting
a Burden of Production on the Defendant Before Admitting Evidence that
Someone Else Committed the Crime Charged: Is It Constitutional?, 76 NEB. L.
REV. 272, 293-94 (1997) (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)). The
case cited by Everhart, Washington v. Texas, held that the Sixth Amendment
right of compulsory process (the defendant's right to present witnesses to establish a defense) applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and that states may not deny defendants this right by
imposing arbitrary rules. 388 U.S. at 17-19, 22-23. A Minnesota case, State v.
Robinson, also addressed this concern. 536 N.W.2d 1, 1 (Minn. 1995). The
opinion stated that the Spreigl and reverse-Spreigl admissibility standards
are identical. Id. at 2. The court noted, "One difference is that Sixth Amendment concerns ([the] right to confront one's accuser and [the] right to present
evidence) enter into the picture when it is the defendant who is seeking to present the evidence." Id.
Restricting the admission of reverse-Spreigl evidence also implicates
rights derived from the Minnesota Constitution. State v. Profit, 591 N.W.2d
451, 471 (Minn. 1999) (en banc). The relevant provision states, "No person
shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law, and
no person shall be put twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense,
nor be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." MINN. CONST.
art. I, § 7. This Note focuses on the federal constitutional rights because that
analysis provides insight into the constitutionality of similar rules in other
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ines the historical development of the Spreigl and reverseSpreigl standard and the ways that courts currently implement
it. Part II compares the application of the test in these situations and discusses the constitutional problems posed by the
standard in reverse-Spreigl cases. Part III proposes amending
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b) to include a separate standard for reverse-Spreigl evidence. This Note concludes that the
reverse-Spreigl standard, particularly as most Minnesota
courts apply it, limits the ability of defendants to present their
cases and must be lowered to avoid continued infringement
upon their Sixth Amendment rights.
I. SPREIGL AND REVERSE-SPREIGL EVIDENCE:
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRIOR
BAD ACTS ADMISSIBILITY STANDARD
Spreigl and reverse-Spreigl evidence serve very different
purposes. 15 They are rooted in two distinct lines of cases that
begin with separate sources. The standard for admitting these
two types of evidence, however, purports to be the same. The
following introduction to the development of Spreigl and reverse-Spreigl evidence facilitates a comparison of the ways
courts treat these cases. This comparison demonstrates the inadequacy of using a single standard for both Spreigl and reverse-Spreigl cases.
A. SPREIGL EVIDENCE IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT

When prosecutors introduce evidence of a defendant's prior
bad acts, they suggest that the Spreigl incidents make it more
likely than it would be without the evidence that the defendant
committed the charged crime. 16 Prosecutors frequently attempt
to introduce Spreigl evidence against criminal defendants.
Since 1999, the Minnesota Court of Appeals and the Minnesota
Supreme Court have heard more than one hundred cases in
which defendants appealed trial courts' admissions of Spreigl
evidence.17 The prevalence of these cases emphasizes the need
to examine Spreigl evidence and the role it plays in Minnesota

states as well as the corresponding federal rule.
15. See discussion supra note 1.
16. See discussion supra note 1.
17. The Author determined this figure by counting the applicable cases.
This total combines the cases heard by the Minnesota Supreme Court and the
Minnesota Court ofAppeals.

20021

REVERSE-SPREIGL EVIDENCE

1037

jurisprudence.
In State v. Fichette,18 an early twentieth century case, the
Minnesota Supreme Court considered the admissibility of prior
bad acts evidence. 19 The case involved a Minneapolis police officer appealing his bribery conviction. 20 The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the prior bad act, which involved
the defendant taking another bribe under similar circumstances, unfairly prejudiced the defendant. 21 The court noted
that "the general rule forbids the introduction of evidence
which will show, or tend to show, that the accused has committed any crime wholly independent of the offense for which he is
on trial."22 Courts may only admit prior bad acts evidence that
fits within one of several exceptions to this general rule. 23 The
court reversed the defendant's conviction because the prior bad
acts evidence should not have been admitted, as it did not fit
within any exception. 24
18. 92 N.W. 527 (Minn. 1902).
19. Id. at 528-29. This Note refers to the evidence in Fichette as "prior
bad acts evidence" rather than as "Spreigi evidence" because Fichette predates
the Spreigl decision.
20. Fichette, 92 N.W. at 527-28. The bribery charge in this case arose
from assertions that the defendant accepted cash in exchange for helping another police officer be reappointed. Id.
21. Id. In the prior incident, the defendant allegedly accepted money to
help an applicant gain a position as a police officer. Id. at 528.
22. Id. at 528 (citing H.C. UNDERHILL, CRIMnAL EVIDENCE, § 87 (1898).
23. Id.; see also Chad M. Oldfather, Other Bad Acts and the Failure of
Precedent, 28 WM. ITCHELL L. REV. 151, 154-55 (2001) (discussing Fichette).

The Fichette court stated that courts admit prior bad acts evidence under the
following circumstances:
as where facts tend to show a distinct hostility, jealousy, or erotic
passion indicated by a previous criminal act; or where the transaction
depends upon the specific intent with which it is committed, when the
claim can be made that the investigated act was the result of a mistake; or where the identity of the accused or of the instrumentality to
perpetrate the crime is so connected or involved in some other act of
guilt that one relates to the other; or, again, where the previous offense is a part of a scheme or conspiracy incidental to or involved in
the one on trial.
Fichette, 92 N.W. at 528.
24. Fichette, 92 N.W. at 529. While Fichette is a solid example of an early
prior bad acts evidence case, not all decisions followed its model. See Oldfather, supra note 23, at 156-57. In State v. Ames, a case factually similar to
Fichette, the court admitted Spreigl evidence of a bribe previously accepted by
a police officer. 96 N.W. 330, 333 (Minn. 1903), noted in Oldfather, supra note
23, at 155-56. The Ames court created a new rule in which "evidence of the
commission of other crimes is admissible when it tends corroboratively or directly to establish the defendant's guilt of the crime charged in the indictment
on trial, or some essential ingredient of such offense." Id.
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More than sixty years later, the Minnesota Supreme Court
decided the case most commonly associated with prior bad acts
evidence. In State v. Spreigl,25 the defendant appealed his conviction for raping his eleven-year-old stepdaughter. 26 The trial
court admitted evidence that the defendant had previously
forced the alleged victim to engage in sexual activities as well
as evidence that the defendant similarly abused other children
in the family. 27 The Minnesota Supreme Court ordered a new
trial because the defendant received insufficient notice of the
28
state's intention to introduce other instances of sexual abuse.
Although the decision rested on procedural grounds, the
Spreigl opinion provides insight into the factors courts should
consider when determining whether to admit Spreigl evi29
dence.
The Spreigl court reiterated that evidence of prior bad acts
should not be admitted unless it fits within an exception to the
general exclusionary rule.30 Such evidence is only admissible
"to show motive, to negative mistake, to establish identity," or
to demonstrate that the prior bad act is part of a scheme or
conspiracy connected to the one being charged. 3 1 The court
stated that in close cases, evidence of prior bad acts should be
excluded pursuant to the accused's right "'to be given the bene32
fit of the doubt."
Spreigl also discussed the relevance of prior bad acts evidence. 33 The Spreigl court stated, "'The assumption of [Spreigl
evidence's] probative value is made throughout the judicial
opinions on this subject.' 34 Since Spreigl evidence generally is
relevant to the charged crime, the more important inquiry is
whether the evidence will inappropriately bias the judge and

25. 139 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1965).
26. Id. at 168.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 172-73.
29. Id. at 171-72.
30. Id. at 169.
31. Id. Comparing the two sets of exceptions indicates that the court in
Spreigi accurately paraphrased the list established in Fichette. See supra note
23.
32. Spreigi, 139 N.W.2d at 172 (quoting State v. Fichette, 92 N.W. 527,
528 (Minn. 1902)).
33. Id.
34. Id. (quoting 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLOAMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
1940).

§§

193-94 (3d ed.
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the jury against the defendant: 35
The natural and inevitable tendency of the tribunal... is to give excessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited, and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge, or to take
the proof of it as36justifying a condemnation irrespective of guilt of the
present charge.

After Spreigl, courts added standards that the prosecution
must meet before admitting evidence of defendants' prior bad
acts. 37 These requirements include proving by clear and convincing evidence the defendant's involvement in the Spreigl incident and introducing evidence of a connection in time, place,
or modus operandi between the charged crime and the Spreigl
38
events.
In 1977, the state adopted MAinnesota Rule of Evidence
39
404(b), a rule regulating the admission of Spreigl evidence.
The rule states,
Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts. Evidence of another crime, wrong, or
act is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In a criminal prosecution, such evidence shall not be admitted
unless the other crime, wrong, or act and the participation in
it by a
40
relevant person are proven by clear and convincing evidence.

35. See id.
36. Id. (quoting 1 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLOAMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 193-94 (3d ed.

1940)). If the evidence's probative value outweighs its potential for prejudice,
courts should admit it. Id. In this context, prejudice refers to "the unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means." State v. Bolte, 530 N.W.2d 191, 197 n.3 (Minn. 1995) (quoting
State v. Cermak, 365 N.W.2d 243, 247 n.2 (Minn. 1985) quoting 22 CHARLES
WRIGHT

& KENNETH

GRAHAM,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE_

EVIDENCE § 5215, at 275 (1978)). As part of the prejudice inquiry, courts consider the need for the proffered evidence. See id. at 197 n.2. This need can be
established both when the evidence is necessary to convict the defendant and
when "it is not clear that the jury will believe the state's other evidence bearing on the disputed issue." Id.
37. Oldfather, supra note 23, at 165.
38. State v. Billstrom, 149 N.W.2d 281, 284-85 (Minn. 1967). That case
includes additional procedural requirements that the state must satisfy. The
prosecution must provide notice to the defendant of its intention to introduce
Spreigl evidence. It also must state which exception to the general exclusionary rule is being invoked. Id.
39. Oldfather, supra note 23, at 151-52.
40. MINN. R. EVID. 404(b).
The Minnesota Rule also states that
"[elvidence of past sexual conduct of the victim in prosecutions under Minn.
Stats. § 609.342 to 609.346 is governed by Minn. R. Evid. 412." The Federal
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At the time of its adoption, courts and commentators
widely classified the rule as a codification of existing case law,
rather than a new approach to determining the admissibility of
Spreigl evidence. 4 1 Therefore, the process of determining the
admissibility of Spreigl evidence probably changed very little as
a result of Minnesota's adoption of the evidentiary rule.
B. REVERSE-SPREIGL EVIDENCE IN ITS HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Reverse-Spreigl rules limit defendants' ability to introduce
42
evidence that a third party committed the charged crime.
Rule of Evidence does not include this provision:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a
criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, or
during trial if the court excuses pretrialnotice on good cause shown, of
the generalnature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.
FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (emphasis added).
The italicized portion of the Federal Rule does not appear in the Minnesota
Rule. Following Spreigl and Billstrom, similar notice provisions apply in Minnesota even though the text of Minnesota Rule 404(b) does not require them.
The Federal Rule codified the deciding principle in State v. Spreigl-thatthe
prosecution must provide reasonable notice of its intent to introduce evidence
of the defendant's prior bad acts. See Oldfather, supra note 23, at 165-66.
The most significant difference between the Minnesota Rule and the Federal Rule involves the standard the prosecution must meet before introducing
evidence of prior bad acts. Federal courts may admit this evidence if the proof
shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the
prior act. United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1432 (6th Cir. 1986). In
Minnesota, the state must introduce clear and convincing evidence linking the
defendant to the Spreigl event. See State v. Johnson, 568 N.W.2d 426, 433
(Minn. 1997) (en banc). That the Minnesota standard is higher than the federal standard helps defendants in a Spreigl context; it holds the prosecution to
a heightened evidentiary standard for admitting evidence of a defendant's involvement in a prior bad act. However, when a defendant attempts to suggest
that a third party committed the charged crime, the Federal Rule requires
that defendant to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the
third party committed a prior bad act. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); Ebens, 800 F.2d at
1432. The Minnesota Rule requires that proof to meet a clear and convincing
standard. Minn. R. Evid 404(b); Johnson, 568 N.W.2d at 433. Therefore, in a
reverse-Spreigl context, the Minnesota Rule is harder on defendants than the
corresponding Federal Rule. Accordingly, the Minnesota Rule creates a
greater infringement upon the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights than does
Federal Rule 404(b). See discussion infra Part II.
41. See Oldfather, supra note 23, at 166-67.
42. See State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Minn. 1997) (describing
the requirements that defendants must meet to introduce reverse-Spreigl evi-
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When courts admit the evidence, defendants use it to help create reasonable doubt about their guilt by suggesting that a
third party committed the charged crime. 43 This type of evidence has a long tradition in United States jurisprudence 44 and
most states have a version of reverse-Spreiglevidence. 45
State v. Lilja46 represents Minnesota's early approach to
third party evidence cases. In Lilja, a jury found the defendant
guilty of murdering a man in the victim's rural home.47 The
trial court excluded from evidence a letter inviting the victim to
purchase grain alcohol and testimony that the police found
empty alcohol bottles near the murder scene. 48 Despite the defendant's arguments, the Minnesota Supreme Court defended
the exclusion of the evidence. 49 That court found "[t]here was
nothing tending to connect the letter, these bottles or the writer
of the letter with anything that occurred in connection with the

dence).
43. State v. Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d 150, 159 (Minn. 1977). In criminal
cases, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the
charged crime. State v. Ewing, 84 N.W.2d 904, 909 (Minn. 1957). Some
scholars question whether the state can constitutionally place limits on defendants' ability to introduce evidence for this purpose. See discussion infra Part
II.
44. See State v. Bock, 39 N.W.2d 887, 891 (Minn. 1949) (citing 2 JOHN
HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYsTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 304 (3d ed. 1940)). The court in Bock
quoted Wigmore's description of third party evidence:
It should be noted that this kind of evidence may be also available to
negative the accused's guilt. E.g. if A is charged with forgery, and
denies it, and if B can be shown to have done a series of similar forgeries connected by a plan, this plan of B is some evidence that B and
not A committed the forgery charged.
Id.
45. See 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES
COURTS AND STATE COURTS 404-132 to 404-162 (1996) (outlining numerous
states' versions of Federal Rule of Evidence 404).
46. 193 N.W. 178 (Minn. 1923).
47. Id. at 178.
48. Id. at 180.
49. Id. The "third party" evidence in this case likely served two functions.
First, it suggested that someone else committed the crime. Second, the evidence implied that the victim was involved with alcohol, which is significant
since the case was decided during prohibition. See MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC SAFETY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF 63 YEARS OF MINNESOTA ALCOHOL

BEVERAGE REGULATION, at http'/ww.dps.state.mn.us/alcgamb/alcenf/
lchist.html (2001). The inference, therefore, would have reflected negatively
on the victim's character.
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murder nor with any one [sic] concerned in its commission." 50
Noting that the facts could have caused the jury to believe that
someone other than the defendant (likely a "bootlegger") committed the murder, the court excluded the evidence. 51 The Lilja
court found that these facts alone could not justify such an in52
ference.
In 1949, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided the state's
seminal third party evidence case, State v. Bock. 53 Bock faced
forgery charges. 54 He allegedly stole a check-printing machine,
created fake checks, and attempted to cash them.55 The trial
court excluded the defendant's evidence that another person
had passed checks identical to those in the charged crime. 56 In
its decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that the defendant
should also have the right to show that crimes of a similar nature
have been committed by some other person when the acts of such
other person are so closely connected in point of time and method of
operation as to cast doubt upon the identification of defendant
as the
57
person who committed the crime charged against him.

The court considered the similarity between the charged
crimes and the third party's conduct and concluded that the
58
trial court erred by excluding the defendant's evidence.
The Minnesota Supreme Court's next major reverseSpreigl decision came more than twenty-five years later. In
State v. Hawkins,59 a murder case, the court reviewed a trial
court's exclusion of evidence that the state's primary witness
killed the victim. 60 It stated that because the third party was a

50. Lilja, 193 N.W. at 180.
51. Id.
52. Id. The Lilja court required a connection in time, place, or modus operandi between the charged crime and the third party evidence. Id. Courts
frequently exclude third party evidence because it lacks such a connection.
See, e.g., State v. Porter, 411 N.W.2d 187, 191 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
that because the defendant made no showing connecting the third party to the
crime, "his proffered evidence had little or no probative value and was largely
irrelevant to the facts of this case").
53. 39 N.W.2d 887 (Minn. 1949).
54. Id. at 888.
55. Id. The prosecution claimed that the defendant made three attempts
to cash forged checks. Id. at 888-89.
56. Id. at 892.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 260 N.W.2d 150 (Minn. 1977).
60. Id. at 159. The defendant sought to introduce evidence that the
state's witness and the victim spoke about stolen guns and that the witness
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witness for the prosecution, "with a possible motive to convict
the defendant to save himself," the reverse-Spreigl evidence
was "especially applicable." 61 The court held that the trial
court should have permitted the defendant to introduce the
62
evidence.
C. THE MODERN CASES
For purposes of comparison, this Note discusses two cases,
State v. Berry63 , a Spreigl case, and State v. Profitj a reverseSpreigl case. These cases provide a framework for examining
the ways that modem courts treat Spreigl and reverse-Spreigl
evidence. 65
1. A Spreigl Case: State v. Berry
In State v. Berry, a jury found the defendant guilty of firstdegree murder for the act of inducing his friend to kill one of
their acquaintances. 66 During a party held at his home, the defendant allegedly indicated to several individuals that he
wanted the victim to die. 67 The state introduced evidence that
the victim owed the defendant twelve hundred dollars and also
that the defendant believed the victim was "a snitch."68 The
state presented evidence that the defendant asked his friend,
the state's principal witness, to kill the victim, but the witness
refused. 69 The defendant then allegedly asked another individual to murder the victim.7 0

The prosecution argued that the

person who ultimately agreed to perform the act drove away

tended to become violent while intoxicated. Id. at 158.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 160.
63. 484 N.W.2d 14 (Minn. 1992) (en banc).
64. 591 N.W.2d 451 (Minn. 1999) (en banc).
65. These particular cases provide examples of the typical decisions courts
currently issue. Both are Minnesota Supreme Court decisions that include
significant discussion of admissibility issues.
66. 484 N.W.2d at 15. Under Minnesota law, one is "criminally liable for

a crime committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires,
counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the
crime." MINN. STAT. § 609.05, subd. 1 (1990). The defendant was charged
with violating this statute. Berry, 484 N.W.2d at 15.
67. See Berry, 484 N.W.2d at 15. The defendant acknowledged threatening to kill the victim, but denied soliciting anyone to kill her. Id. at 16.
68. Id. at 15.
69. Id. at 16.
70. Id.
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with the victim. 7 1 Between thirty and forty-five minutes later,
72
the suspected murderer returned to the party by himself.
The trial court admitted Spreigl evidence of three prior
acts the defendant committed. 73 The first act took place eight
years before the act being prosecuted in this trial.74 In this
first incident, the defendant went to the home of a man he
wanted to punish for "snitching." 5 A witness who accompanied
the defendant to the house "testified that he heard things being
broken inside the house and a loud bang or report which
sounded like a gun-shot."76 In the second Spreigl incident, the
defendant told a woman's roommates that "he wanted to beat
up [the woman] and to kill her because she had snitched on
him."7 7 In the last instance, approximately one month before
the conduct at issue, the defendant pointed a gun at a man's
head and threatened to "beat his ass" if the man did not do as
commanded;7 8 the man complied with the defendant's order
79
and the defendant took no further action against him.
The trial court found that the evidence satisfied each element of the Spreigl test.80 The defendant argued that none of
the three incidents was sufficiently similar to the charged
crime. 81 In response, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted that
"absolute similarity between the charged offense and the
Spreigl incident is not required to establish relevancy" 82 and
that "[e]ach of the three incidents [was] relevant because of the
similarity of the way [the defendant] behaved when trying to
maintain control of the people with whom he worked." 83 Accordingly, the evidence demonstrated that the defendant used
71. Id. The defendant remained at the party while the suspected murderer was gone. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 17.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 16. The Minnesota Supreme Court's list of Spreigl elements
is nearly identical to the elements it lists in the reverse-Spreigl case discussed
in Part I.C.2. See infra text accompanying note 98. The court also noted that
the defendant held the burden of showing that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of each Spreigl incident. See Berry, 484 N.W.2d at 17.
81.

See Berry, 484 N.W.2d at 17.

82. Id. (citing State v. Landin, 472 N.W.2d 854, 860 (Minn. 1991)).
83. Id.
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threats and violent acts against people who had "snitched" on
him.84 The court found that the state needed the evidence to
show that the defendant "carried out his threats."85 Furthermore, it determined that "[the probative value of the Spreigl
evidence outweighed any potential for unfair prejudice" because
there was "no danger that the jury would punish [the defendant] for his past acts." 86 The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the Spreigl evidence "complete[d] the picture" of the
defendant, but did not "paint another picture."8 7 Thus, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the Spreigl evi88
dence.
In dissent, Justice Gardebring argued that the admission
89
of the Spreigl evidence constituted an abuse of discretion.
Disputing the majority's finding that the Spreigl events established the defendant's modus operandi,90 Gardebring noted that
the concept of modus operandi would be expanded "so far...
that any history of threats or violence becomes proof that a defendant was merely committing a crime in his or her usual
manner."9 1 Justice Gardebring therefore reasoned that the
Spreigl incidents suggest that the defendant "talk[s] tough" and
"damag[es] property" but do not establish that the defendant
92
followed a modus operandiin the victim's murder.
2. A Reverse-Spreigl Case: State v. Profit
In State v. Profit,93 a jury found the defendant guilty of the
May 1996 murder of a prostitute. 94 The prosecution successfully admitted evidence of two rapes and a sexual assault com84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 18. The court stated that the evidence was probative of his intent to kill the victim and of his modus operandiin making and carrying out

threats. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. "[Aidmission of Spreigl evidence rests within the sound discretion
of the trial court." Id. at 17 (citing State v. DeWald, 464 N.W.2d 500, 503
(Minn. 1991)).
89. Id. at 20 (Gardebring, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 21 (Gardebring, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 20 (Gardebring, J., dissenting).
92. Id. (Gardebring, J., dissenting). The dissenting opinion noted that the
defendant faced charges of requesting that another man murder the victim,
whereas the Spreigl events suggested a "hot tempered" impulsivity inconsistent with this method of killing. Id. at 21 (Gardebring, J., dissenting).
93. 591 N.W.2d 451 (Minn. 1999).
94. Id. at 455.
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mitted by the defendant before the charged incident. 95 The defendant attempted to introduce reverse-Spreigl evidence showing that the murder at issue was part of a series and that he
had identified the serial killer.9 6 The district court excluded
this evidence, which included proof that linked the third party
to a handwritten letter confessing to one of the murders. 97 The
Minnesota Supreme Court stated that before it would admit
reverse-Spreigl evidence, the defendant must show (1) "'clear
and convincing evidence'" of the third party's involvement in
the reverse-Spreigl incident; (2) that the reverse-Spreigl incident is relevant and material to the charged crime; and (3) that
the "'probative value" of the reverse-Spreigl incident exceeds
the "potential for unfair prejudice'" created by its admission
into evidence.9 8
To be relevant, a "reverse[-]Spreigl incident must be similar to the charged offense either in time, location, or modus operandi." 99 The court acknowledged numerous similarities between the charged murder and the series of killings. 10 0 Despite
creating an inference that the same perpetrator committed all
95. Id. at 457. All three prior crimes took place in north Minneapolis,
Minnesota, during early September 1981, approximately fifteen years before
the charged crime. Id.
96. Id. at 463.
97. Id. at 462. Prior to trial, the trial court excluded this evidence in response to the prosecution's motion in limine. Id. at 463. The Minnesota Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the evidence. Id. In its discussion of the issue, the court noted that the
"circumstances surrounding" the letter "do little to ensure its validity." Id. at
465. The court stated that the police affidavits about the letter "indicate[d]
that the police suspected [the defendant], not [the third party], had committed
the killings." Id. at 466. According to the court, the police believed the third
party's argument that the defendant had ordered the third party to write the
letter. Id.
The court also noted that the defense failed to call the third party to
testify at trial. Id. at 463. Without such testimony, the letter was hearsay.
Id. at 466. In dissent, Justice Russell Anderson noted that by granting the
state's motion in limine, the trial court prevented the defendant from questioning the third party about the letter at trial. Id. at 471 (R. Anderson, J.,
dissenting). The defendant claimed "there was no longer any purpose" in calling the third party because the court's ruling on the prosecution's motion
barred the defense from eliciting the third party's testimony about the letter.
Id. at 463.
98. Id. at 463-64 (quoting State v. Johnson, 568 N.W.2d 426, 428 (Minn.
1997) (en banc)).
99. Id. at 464 (quoting State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Minn.
1997) (en banc)).
100. Id. The court noted that the police investigated the charged murder
as one of the serial killings, as the defendant argued. Id.
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of the murders, 0 1 the court concluded that "this inference was
of little value to [the defendant] unless he also provided clear
and convincing evidence10 2 that someone other than he...
committed the killings."1 0 3 The Profit court also emphasized
that appellate courts should grant great deference to trial
courts in evidence matters.1 4 Thus, "taken as a whole," the
court concluded, "the record does more to suggest that [the defendant] committed all of the purported serial killings than to
show clear and convincing evidence that [the third party] participated in any of them."10 5 As a result, the court found no
abuse of discretion in the lower0 6court's exclusion of the defendant's reverse-Spreigl evidence.
Justice Russell Anderson, who dissented on the reverseSpreigl issue, disagreed with the majority's characterization of
the defendant's evidence.10 7 He noted that the third party
could access the defendant's car, which contained "[t]he only direct evidence" implicating the defendant. 0 8 Justice Anderson
called the reverse-Spreigl evidence "all the more compelling"
because the state used Spreigl evidence against the defendant.'0 9 He concluded that the court committed prejudicial error when it excluded the defendant's reverse-Spreigl evidence.110

101. Id.
102. Id. The court defined clear and convincing evidence as 'more than a
preponderance of the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.'"
Id. (quoting Weber v. Anderson, 269 N.W.2d 892, 895 (Minn. 1978)). The court
used examples of clear and convincing evidence from a Spreigl context, explaining that a conviction, a confession, or a victim's clear identification of the
defendant as the perpetrator of a prior crime would establish the defendant's
participation in the crime by clear and convincing evidence. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 466.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See id. at 469-70.
108. Id. at 469 (R. Anderson, J., dissenting). The car contained some fibers
similar to those used to strangle the murder victim. Id. The defendant's wallet also was found near the site where the victim's body was discovered. Id.
The defendant provided testimony that he stored his wallet in his car. Id.
This evidence and the letter led Justice Russell Anderson to conclude that the
majority deprived the defendant of his right "to present a defense in a criminal
trial" under both the United States and Minnesota Constitutions. Id. at 47071.
109. Id. at 470 (R. Anderson, J., dissenting).
110. Id. at 471 (R. Anderson, J., dissenting). See supra note 95 and accompanying text for a description of the Spreigl incidents admitted.
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II. THE HEIGHTENED ADMISSIBILITY STANDARD FOR
REVERSE-SPREIGL EVIDENCE: CONSTITUTIONAL
IMPLICATIONS AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. THE SPREIGL AND REVERSE-SPREIGL STANDARDS: IDENTICAL
LANGUAGE, DIVERGENT APPLICATIONS

The cases previously outlined for comparison, Berry and
Profit, help illustrate the differences in treatment that courts
give to Spreigl and reverse-Spreigl evidence. To be admitted,
reverse-Spreigl incidents must be nearly identical to the crime
being charged."n
Even though the police originally investigated the murder in Profit as one of a series,1 1 2 the court prevented the defendant from introducing evidence showing a connection between a third party and one of the previous
killings. 113 The Spreigl incidents admitted in Berry have less in
common with the charged crime than the reverse-Spreigl
events excluded in Profit.114 In Berry, the defendant verbally
threatened individuals in two separate instances and used a
gun to threaten a man in the third. 115 The defendant did not
dispute threatening to kill the victim. 116 However, he did deny
asking another man to murder the victim. 1 7 The majority
overlooked this difference in modus operandi and found that

111. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 568 N.W.2d 426, 434 (Minn. 1997) (en
bane). The Johnson court concluded the trial court properly excluded the reverse-Spreigl evidence. Id. The trial and appellate courts agreed the evidence
lacked similarity with the charged incident, id., even though the two incidents
occurred within sixteen months of one another, twenty blocks apart, and both
involved a group of juveniles shooting a .22 caliber handgun into a car with
Asian American passengers. Id. The court based its holding in part on the
fact that one was a random shooting while the other involved retaliatory motives. Id.
112. Profit, 591 N.W.2d at 456.
113. Id. at 466. The defendant's best reverse-Spreigl evidence was a letter
in which the third party confessed to committing a similar murder. Id. at 465.
That murder took place "under nearly identical circumstances," a few weeks
later, and less than two blocks away from the site where the victim in the
charged crime was found. Id. at 470-71 (R. Anderson, J., dissenting). The
third party later repudiated that confession. Id. at 466.
114. For a description of the Spreigl incidents admitted in Berry, see supra
notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
115. State v. Berry, 484 N.W.2d 14, 16-17 (Minn. 1992) (en banc).
116. Id. at 16.
117. Id.
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the trial court "properly admitted" 118 the threats as Spreigl evidence that the defendant ordered the victim's murder.' 19 Had a
defendant introduced that evidence in a reverse-Spreigl context, it probably would not have been admitted.
Minnesota courts also require a tighter connection in time
between the Spreigl incident and the crime charged when a defendant, rather than the state, seeks to introduce the evidence.
The first Spreigl incident admitted in Berry took place eight
years before the charged crime. 120 In contrast, courts frequently conclude that reverse-Spreiglincidents are too old to be
admitted. In his Gumtow special concurrence, Judge Randall
compared the way that courts treat the age of Spreigl and reverse-Spreigl evidence.121 He noted that trial courts admit
Spreigl evidence of events up to twenty years old, but rarely
provide reverse-Spreigl incidents with such lenient treat122
ment.
The Spreigl and reverse-Spreigl tests also differ in the way
courts approach prejudice issues. In Spreigl and reverseSpreigl cases, courts determine if the probative value of the extraneous incident exceeds its potential for prejudice. 123 In
Berry, the court found the Spreigl evidence to be probative on
the issue of whether the defendant ordered the victim's murder. 124 The majority, however, overstated the evidence's power.
The court found that the Spreigl evidence reflected upon the
defendant's modus operandi of carrying out the threats he
made. 125 Yet, none of the Spreigl incidents involved the defen-

118. Id. at 18.
119. Id. The dissent argued that the Spreigl incidents were so dissimilar
that they made the defendant's participation in the charged crime seem less
likely. Id. at 21 (Gardebring, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 16. In Profit, the Spreigl crimes took place fifteen years before
the defendant's trial. State v. Profit, 591 N.W.2d 451, 457 (Minn. 1999) (en
banc). Berry and Profit are not comparable on this point, however, because in
Profit the defendant spent the majority of the ensuing fifteen years in prison.

Id.
121. State v. Gumtow, No. C4-96-663, 1997 WL 161858, at *7 (Minn. Ct.
App. Apr. 8, 1997) (Randall, J., concurring).
122. Id.
123. State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Minn. 1997) (en banc) (stating that admitting reverse-Spreigl evidence requires "a showing that the probative value of the reverse[-]Spreiglevidence outweighs its potential for unfair
prejudice").
124. Berry, 484 N.W.2d at 18.
125. Id.
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dant acting on his threats. 126 Further, the court dismissed the
evidence's potential for prejudice.12 7 It simply stated that the
jury would not punish the defendant for the Spreigl incidents, 128 largely ignoring the human tendency to allow uncharged bad acts to weigh into decisions about defendants' guilt
and punishment. 129 The court's perfunctory review of prejudice
issues was insufficient to establish that the Spreigl evidence
would not inappropriately bias the jury against the defendant,
130
a key inquiry in determining the evidence's admissibility.
The Profit court seemed particularly confused when it applied prejudice concerns in the reverse-Spreigl context. In that
case, the majority and dissent expressed different conclusions
about the probative value of the defendant's reverse-Spreigl
evidence. 131 Yet neither opinion addressed whether the exclusion of the evidence resulted in prejudice. 132 This omission
could result from uncertainty about the way prejudice functions
in reverse-Spreigl cases. In Spreigl cases, the rules seek to
prevent juries from using prior misconduct to conclude that the
defendant conformed with his poor character in committing the
charged crime. 133 In reverse-Spreigl cases, the extraneous incidents involve third parties, not defendants. 134 They, therefore,
will not prejudice defendants as they might in Spreigl cases. 135

126. Id. at 16-17.
127. Id. at 18.
128. Id.
129. See State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167, 172 (Minn. 1965); supra note 36
and accompanying text.
130. See Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d at 172.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 105 and 107-08. Compare State v.
Profit, 591 N.W.2d 451, 466 (Minn. 1999) (en banc) (majority opinion), with
Profit, 591 N.W.2d at 469-70 (dissenting opinion).
132. See generally Profit, 591 N.W.2d 451.
133. See Joan L. Larsen, Of Propensity, Prejudice,and PlainMeaning: The
Accused's Use of Exculpatory Specific Acts Evidence and the Need to Amend

Rule 404(b), 87 NW. U. L. REV. 651, 658 (1993) (noting that the standards of
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) are designed to protect defendants).
134. See id. at 657-60 (discussing the greater risk of prejudice in admitting
prior bad acts evidence committed by defendants than when committed by
third parties).
135. See United States v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906, 911 (2d Cir.
1984). In Aboumoussallem, the Second Circuit recognized that admissibility
considerations may require adaptation when defendants use them to introduce
potentially exculpatory evidence. Id. The Aboumoussallem court stated that
"the standard of admissibility when a criminal defendant offers similar acts
evidence as a shield need not be as restrictive as when a prosecutor uses such
evidence as a sword." Id.
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Only the omission of this evidence negatively affects defen136
dants.
Two other considerations assist the state in introducing
Spreigl incidents but work against defendants seeking to admit
reverse-Spreigl evidence. First, Spreigl evidence carries a presumption of probativeness. 137 Although reverse-Spreigl evidence permits the trier of fact to identify the person who committed the charged crime, the evidence, unlike Spreigl
evidence, has no such presumption. 138 Courts frequently ex139
clude reverse-Spreigl evidence for lacking probative value.
Second, courts exclude Spreigl evidence in close cases to give
defendants the benefit of the doubt. 140 As the courts currently
interpret the rule, no comparable presumption exists in favor of
admitting reverse-Spreigl evidence when the defendant nearly
satisfies every element of the test.141
These differences in applicable presumptions may appear
sensible when one considers that Spreigl rules are designed to
protect defendants. Defendant protections, however, should
not be limited to Spreigl cases. Reverse-Spreigl cases should
involve similar considerations based on defendants' constitutional right to present exculpatory evidence. 14 2 The lack of
these protections in reverse-Spreigl cases makes it more difficult for defendants to introduce exculpatory evidence than it is
for the prosecution to admit evidence of defendants' previous
misdeeds. This discrepancy is particularly egregious because
reverse-Spreigl evidence relates directly to the incident being
charged. Hence, it is highly relevant and merits consideration
by the fact-finder. In contrast, Spreigl evidence has a more in136. The omission of credible reverse-Spreigl evidence harms defendants
because it denies them the opportunity to create reasonable doubt by suggesting that another person committed the charged crime. This negative effect,
however, does not constitute prejudice. Prejudice involves persuasion through
illegitimate means, such as the anger a jury might feel toward a defendant
who committed prior acts of violence. See sources cited supra note 36 and accompanying text.
137. See State v. Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d 167, 172 (Minn. 1965).
138. The Author has never encountered an opinion that asserts that reverse-Spreigl evidence carries a presumption of probativeness.
139. See, e.g., State v. Porter, 411 N.W.2d 187, 191 (1987) (upholding the
exclusion of the defendant's reverse-Spreigl evidence because it had "little or
no probative value").
140. See Spreigl, 139 N.W.2d at 172.
141. The Author has not discovered any judicial opinions stating that
courts should admit reverse-Spreigl evidence in close cases.
142. See discussion infra Part I.B.1.
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direct relationship to the charged crime. While its admission
can be probative, it does not bear directly on the guilt of the accused for the crime presently charged.

B. THE REVERSE-SPREIGL STANDARD: IMPOSING LIMITATIONS
ON DEFENDANTS' ABILITY TO EXERCISE THEIR SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS

The preceding analysis compares reverse-Spreigl with
Spreigl evidence to illustrate the actual standard that defendants must meet before they are permitted to introduce reverse-Spreigl evidence. The following section analyzes how the
standard implicates defendants' Sixth Amendment right to put
on a defense.
1. Classifying the Evidence for Constitutional Analysis
This Note asserts that Minnesota's reverse-Spreigl standard interferes with defendants' rights under the Sixth
Amendment. 4 3 Since the 1960s, courts have interpreted the
Sixth Amendment to include the right to put on a meaningful
defense.14
The Supreme Court has construed the Sixth
Amendment to include the right to introduce exculpatory evidence.145 Reverse-Spreigl evidence can be classified as potentially exculpatory evidence. 146 This Note argues, therefore, that
rules that make it difficult for the defendant to present reverseSpreigl evidence should be struck down as violating the Sixth
Amendment.147
Limitations on the admissibility of reverse-Spreigl evidence would not pose the same constitutional problems if de143. See State v. Profit, 591 N.W.2d 451, 471 (Minn. 1999) (R. Anderson, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the court's exclusion of the defendant's reverseSpreigl evidence "denied [the defendant] his constitutional right to present a
defense"); see also Everhart, supra note 14, at 298 (stating that "the accused in
a criminal case has a constitutional right to admit third-party guilt evidence").
144. Thomas J. Reed, Admission of Other Criminal Act Evidence After
Adoption of the FederalRules of Evidence, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 113, 164 (1984).
The right to put forth a meaningful defense began with Gideon v. Wainwright.
372 U.S. 335 (1963). That case provided indigent felony defendants with the
right to state-appointed legal counsel. Id. at 345.
145. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967) (upholding a defendant's
right to present witnesses to establish a defense under the compulsory process
clause and applying it to the states under the Due Process Clause).
146. See State v. Renekke, 563 N.W.2d 335 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
147. See Everhart, supra note 14, at 285.
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fendants used the evidence to establish an affirmative defense.14 8 States may require that the burden of production shift
to defendants with regard to affirmative defenses. 149 When the
burden shifts to the proponent of an affirmative defense, that
proponent generally must provide evidentiary support for his
affirmative defenses before moving forward with the claim. 150
Reverse-Spreigl evidence, however, is not used in the context of affirmative defenses. 15 1 Instead, the defendant uses it to
cast reasonable doubt on the prosecution's claim. 152 ReverseSpreigl evidence negates a crucial element of the state's case:
that the defendant committed the charged crime. 153 In Profit,
for example, the defense attempted to introduce reverse-Spreigl
evidence to establish that the third party, rather than the de154
fendant, committed the murder at issue.
Since reverse-Spreigl evidence is not an affirmative defense and merits Sixth Amendment protection, the state arguably may not place any restrictions on its admission. 155 Under this view, all limits on reverse-Spreigl evidence violate the

148. Id. at 285.
149. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 205 (1977). In Patterson, the
Supreme Court held that requiring a defendant to prove he committed manslaughter, not murder, did not violate due process. Id. A New York statute
essentially made manslaughter an affirmative defense for defendants charged
with first-degree murder. Id. at 206.
150. See Everhart, supra note 14, at 288-89.
151. Id. at 290. Affirmative defenses typically fit into one of two categories.
Id. The first type involves excusing or justifying the commission of the
charged crime. Id. A second type of affirmative defense falls "peculiarly
within the knowledge of the accused," as does a claim of insanity. Id. at 291
(quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.12(3) (1985) (defining "affirmative defenses")). Reverse-Spreigl evidence does not fit into either of those classifications. See id. at 290. Technically, reverse-Spreigl evidence does not introduce
a new issue in the case. See id. at 293. In the types of cases in which the defendant would attempt to introduce reverse-Spreigl evidence, the court must
determine whether the defendant perpetrated the charged crime. See id. The
identity of the defendant, therefore, is an element of the prosecution's case and
not a separate issue that the defendant may decide to introduce. Id.
152. State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Minn. 1997) (en banc).
153. Reverse-Spreigl evidence more closely resembles an alibi defense than
an affirmative defense. See Everhart, supra note 14, at 292. The defendant
who claims to have an alibi uses that evidence to demonstrate that he or she
was unavailable to commit the charged crime. The proponent of reverseSpreigl evidence uses it to show that he or she is not guilty by asserting that a
third party committed the charged crime. Id. at 293.
154. See State v. Profit, 591 N.W.2d 451, 463 (Minn. 1999) (en banc).
155. See Everhart, supra note 14, at 290; see also supra note 151 and accompanying text.
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Constitution. 156
Although this argument is logically consistent with the
aforementioned principles, compelling interests suggest flaws
in the position. First, defendants do not have an absolute right
to bring forth exculpatory evidence.157 Defendants do not have,
for example, the power to introduce evidence that lacks all
credibility. 158 Imagine that a defendant claimed that he was
unavailable to commit the charged crime because he was vacationing on Mars. Theoretically, he has a right to introduce that
testimony. The court, however, would not permit the defendant
to present this testimony because it would be deemed irrele59
vant.2
Second, the court similarly would restrict the defendant
from presenting numerous collateral issues. 160 Consider, for
example, the case of a defendant who won a motion to suppress
evidence that the police illegally seized. In this situation, the
issue of the illegal seizure is collateral to the charged crime.
The court previously dealt with the police misconduct by excluding the evidence in question. Therefore, the court would
probably prevent the defendant from testifying about the seizure issue. Defendants, therefore, likely do not have an absolute right to introduce reverse-Spreiglevidence.
Requiring defendants to establish the materiality of third
party evidence is an ingrained feature of the U.S. criminal justice system. 161 In Minnesota, courts have restricted the admissibility of reverse-Spreigl evidence for at least seventy-five
years. 62 Most states have adopted an evidentiary rule similar
156. Everhart, supra note 14, at 275.
157. Ellen Yankiver Suni, Who Stole the Cookie From the Cookie Jar?: The
Law and Ethics of Shifting Blame in Criminal Cases, 68 FORDHAM L. REV.
1643, 1687 (2000).
158. Id. (noting that "[a] defendant is not at liberty to present unsupported
theories.., and invite the jury to speculate as to some cause other than one
supported by the evidence").
159. Id. In this type of situation, the court would likely base its exclusion
on Minnesota's relevancy rule. MINN. R. EviD.401.
160. See MINN. R. EVID. 403 (permitting courts to exclude relevant evidence if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of...
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence").
161. See Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 350, 356 (1891) (recognizing
that trial judges have the discretion to exclude third party evidence that has
"no legitimate tendency" to show that a third party committed the charged
crime).
162. In the 1923 case State v. Lilja, the court excluded the defendant's
third party evidence. 193 N.W. 178, 180 (Minn. 1923). For a discussion of this
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to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).1 63 These rules, like Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b), often require some connection between the third party and the charged crime.lM By arguing
that all such restrictions are unconstitutional, a defendant essentially asks a court to reject this long-accepted principle.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not decided a case in which a
defendant argues that restrictions on third party evidence limit
his Sixth Amendment right to put on a defense.1 65 However,
the Supreme Court has stated that third party evidence should
have a "legitimate tendency" to establish that the third party
committed the charged crime. 66 The Supreme Court has also
found that defendants have a constitutional right to present
16 7
evidence that a third party committed the charged crime.
Therefore, when the Court does hear the issue, it will be more
likely to find that a standard for admitting third party evidence
violates the Sixth Amendment because it is too high than it
would be to find the mere existence of a limitation unconstitutional.
The Minnesota Supreme Court also would be unlikely to
find that all limitations on the admissibility of reverse-Spreigl
evidence violate the Sixth Amendment. The court rarely comments on this issue and has not cited constitutional concerns
when overturning lower courts' exclusions of reverse-Spreigl
evidence.1 68 An appropriate challenge, therefore, should attack
the rigor of particular restrictions rather than the existence of
any such limit.

exclusion, see supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.
163. See 2 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 45, at 404-132 to 404-162
(discussing the evidentiary rules of thirty-five states and Puerto Rico and noting that each has adopted a rule similar to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)).
164. See Brett C. Powell, Perry Mason Meets the "Legitimate Tendency"
Standard of Admissibility (And Doesn't Like What He Sees), 55 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 1023, 1030-48 (2001) (noting that California, Wisconsin, South Dakota,
and Washington all require some link between the third party and the charged

crime).

165. See Everhart, supra note 14, at 294. The Author of this Note confirmed that the Supreme Court has not taken such a case since the 1997 publication of the Everhart article.
166. Alexander, 138 U.S. at 356.
167. See Powell, supra note 164, at 1031 (discussing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), and Washington v. Texas, 338 U.S. 14 (1967) ,in
support of this proposition).
168. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 536 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 1995).
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2. Exploring the Rights and Principles Challenged by
Minnesota's Reverse-Spreigl Standard
When determining the admissibility of reverse-Spreigl evidence, courts should narrowly apply the rules restricting defendants' ability to present this evidence. Allowing its admission furthers the public policies of both avoiding false
convictions and 6determining
what actually occurred in a
9
charged incident. 1
By preventing some defendants from introducing reliable
reverse-Spreigl evidence, Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b)
does not provide sufficient protection against false convictions.
Defendants who cannot meet each element of Minnesota's restrictive reverse-Spreigl standard may not introduce evidence
that another party committed the charged crime. 170 Without
this information about the third party, courts and juries probably convict innocent defendants at a higher rate than they
would if they could consider the defendant's reverse-Spreigl
evidence.
The conviction of innocent defendants violates a central
principle of the U.S. criminal justice system. As Justice Harlan
stated, it is a "fundamental value determination of our society
that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a
guilty man go free."1 7 1 Blackstone communicated a similar conclusion when he stated, "[Tihe law holds that it is better that
ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer." 172 The
level of proof required by Minnesota's reverse-Spreigl test,
however, suggests that the system places more value on principles other than avoiding false convictions. 17 3 As Harlan and
169. See Brook K. Baker, TraditionalIssues of ProfessionalResponsibility
and a Transformative Ethic of Client Empowerment for Legal Disclosure, 34
NEW ENG. L. REV. 809, 849 (2000) (noting that the Rules of Professional Con-

duct "are designed to preserve the truth finding and justice dispensing goals of
the legal system").
170. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 593 N.W.2d 227, 233-34 (Minn. 1999) (en
banc) (upholding the exclusion of reverse-Spreigl evidence because the defendant failed to connect the third party to the charged crime).
171. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970).
172.

4 WILLIAM BLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.

173. Considerations weighing in favor of excluding reverse-Spreigl evidence include preventing jury confusion, saving time and money by excluding
new issues, and avoiding surprise. See David P. Bryden & Roger C. Park,
"Other Crimes"Evidence in Sex Offense Cases, 78 MNN. L. REV. 529, 537, 582-

83 (1994) (discussing these issues in the context of sexual assault crimes).
Another frequently cited consideration involves protecting innocent third parties from accusations by defendants. See State v. Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d 150,

20021

REVERSE-SPREIGL EVIDENCE

1057

Blackstone suggest, guarding against the conviction and punishment of innocent defendants should be among the system's
highest priorities.
The reverse-Spreigl standard also fails to advance truthfinding. The current standard prevents some defendants from
providing the tribunal with the information necessary to implicate a guilty party. If the proper authorities use this information to charge and convict a third party, the reverse-Spreigl
evidence helps courts arrive at the truth.
The Supreme Court has twice noted that restricting the
admission of potentially exculpatory evidence makes courts less
capable of discovering the truth. 174 In those cases, the Court
held that a court may exclude relevant exculpatory evidence
without violating the Constitution when the exclusion helps the
judicial process operate more rationally. 175 These cases support
excluding reverse-Spreigl evidence when it may confuse the
jury or prejudice the defendant, thereby impeding the rationality of the proceeding. 17 6 The Supreme Court's exclusion of evidence in the two applicable cases, however, functioned to punish and deter serious procedural errors by the defense. 177 The
reverse-Spreigl evidence contemplated by this Note does not
perform this function. Rather, the evidence helps the defense
establish its claim that the prosecution charged the wrong person with the crime. The grounds the Supreme Court has previously used to exclude defendants' evidence, therefore, do not
apply in the reverse-Spreiglcases under consideration.
Defendants often face substantial obstacles when trying to
159 (Minn. 1977). The Hawkins court suggested that requiring proof of a connection between the third party and the charged crime "safeguards the third
[party] from indiscriminate use of past differences with the [crime victim]."
Id.
174. See Donald A. Dripps, Relevant But PrejudicialExculpatory Evidence:
Rationality Versus Jury Trial and the Right to Put on a Defense, 69 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1389, 1404-07 (1996). The relevant cases are Michigan v. Lucas, 500
U.S. 145, 149 (1991), and Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 409 (1988).
175. In Taylor, the Court upheld the exclusion of testimony by a witness
whom the defense had not identified in discovery. 484 U.S. at 401-02. Lucas
also involved the exclusion of evidence due to the defense's failure to notify the
prosecution of its intention to introduce that evidence. 500 U.S. at 146. The
Lucas Court reversed an appellate court holding that determined the Sixth
Amendment gave rape defendants an absolute right to introduce evidence of
prior consensual sex with the complainant. Id. at 152-53. In this context, rationality means "finding the facts according to evidence" rather than according
to other considerations, such as emotion. Dripps, supra note 174, at 1397.
176. See Dripps, supra note 174, at 1397.
177. See Lucas, 500 U.S. at 146; Taylor, 484 U.S. at 402.
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assemble third party evidence that meets the reverse-Spreigl
standard. First are the hurdles presented by police attempts to
build a case against the defendant.17 8 After a suspect has been
identified, "police have little incentive to investigate further,
especially if that investigation may weaken the case already
built."179 Police officers face considerable pressure to "clear"
cases, particularly those that are notorious or violent. 180 These
demands make it "easy to believe that investigation tends to focus on building a case against a suspect rather than on exploring leads and preserving evidence that might suggest the suspect's innocence."' 1 Following the identification of a suspect,
the police generally will gather evidence "with an eye to convicting [that] suspect.' 82 Even if the evidence suggests another
perpetrator committed the crime, investigating police departments do not have a constitutional duty to preserve evidence
83
that might exculpate defendants.
Secondly, most defendants face financial challenges when
they attempt to investigate a third party's involvement in the
charged crime. To reduce their legal expenses, defendants with
private attorneys may have to restrict the number of hours
spent on investigation. For the growing number of individuals
represented by public defenders, excessive caseloads inhibit the
defendants' ability to gather evidence about the third parties
who may have committed the charged crimes. Overwhelming
caseloads and inadequate resources typify public defense systems.18 4 A study conducted for the State Board of Public De178. See Dripps, supra note 174, at 1416-17.
179. See Suni, supra note 157, at 1690.
180. See id.

181. See Dripps, supra note 174, at 1416-17 (footnote omitted).
182. Id. at 1417.
183. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1988). In Youngblood, the
defendant faced charges of molesting and sodomizing a ten-year-old boy. Id.
at 53. Following the assault, the victim received treatment at a hospital. Id.
His doctor collected evidence with a sexual assault kit. Id. at 52. The police
department did not perform tests on either the samples assembled for the sexual assault kit or the victim's clothing. Id. at 53. The defendant claimed that
the evidence would have exculpated him and that the police department violated his constitutional rights by not performing the tests. See id. at 54. The
U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the failure to perform the tests can "at
worst be described as negligent" and therefore did not involve a constitutional
violation. Id. at 58.
184. David L. Wilson, Note, ConstitutionalLaw: Making A Case for Preserving the Integrity of Minnesota's Public Defender System: Kennedy v. Carlson, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1117, 1138 (1996); see also William J. Stuntz,
The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice,
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fense revealed that "public defenders in Minnesota, with few
exceptions, are working substantially above capacity with insufficient time to devote to their cases185 and clients.... And
things are getting worse in this regard."
Following the rejection of a request for more funds, the
Chief Public Defender of Hennepin County 186 sued a host of
Minnesota politicians. 187 The suit sought to establish that insufficient budgets prevented the County Public Defender's Office from providing sufficient services to its clients. 188 The Public Defender's Office argued that this lack of funds violated the
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel of indigent criminal defendants. 189 While the Supreme Court of
Minnesota rejected this claim, 190 the case is indicative of the
funding problems in the Minnesota's Public Defenders' Office.
Defendants who cannot properly investigate the third party's
involvement in the charged crime have little hope of meeting
Minnesota's strict standard for admitting reverse-Spreigl evidence.
States may place reasonable restrictions on defendants'
ability to introduce third party evidence. 191 Minnesota's standard, however, requires defendants to meet an unreasonably
high standard before introducing reverse-Spreigl evidence,
thereby infringing on defendants' Sixth Amendment rights.
Reverse-Spreigl evidence helps courts further the public policies of avoiding false convictions and arriving at the truth. In
addition, cost and excessive attorney caseloads hamper defen107 YALE L.J. 1, 54 (1997) (noting that current societal trends encourage under-fimding criminal defense systems).
185. Wilson, supra note 184, at 1140-41 (quoting THE SPANGENBERG
GROUP, WEIGHTED CASELOAD STUDY FOR THE STATE OF MINNESOTA BOARD OF
PUBLIC DEFENSE-DRAFT REPORT 20 (1991)). Across Minnesota, public de-

fenders have unionized in an attempt to improve these conditions. Tony Kennedy, Public Defenders Outside Hennepin, Ramsey Counties Vote to Join Union, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., May 14, 1999, at D3. "An attorney has an
ethical duty to investigate a client's claims thoroughly so he or she may give
sound legal advice." Wilson, supra note 184, at 1139. In many cases, public
defenders cannot conduct "any worthwhile investigation" because of inadequate funding. Id. at 1140.
186. Hennepin County includes the City of Minneapolis.
187. Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996). The named officials
included the Governor, Treasurer, Finance Commissioner, State Board of Public Defense, and Hennepin County Commissioners. Id. at 3.
188. Id. at 3.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 8.
191. See supra notes 157-64 and accompanying text.

1060

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.86:1033

dants' efforts to conduct sufficient investigations. 192 For these
reasons, defendants should not be required to meet the current
reverse-Spreigl standard before introducing evidence suggesting that a third party committed the charged crime.
III. AMENDING MINNESOTA RULE OF EVIDENCE 404(B):
A PROPOSAL TO CREATE A SEPARATE ADMISSIBILITY
STANDARD FOR REVERSE-SPREIGL EVIDENCE
Part II.A of this Note argued that courts apply Minnesota
Rule of Evidence 404(b) more strictly when defendants, rather
than prosecutors, use the rule to introduce evidence. 193 Even if
courts applied the standard identically, however, reverseSpreigl rules may still infringe on defendants' Sixth Amendment rights. In the manner that courts currently apply those
rules, the constitutional violation is even more egregious. Accordingly, Minnesota should amend the applicable evidentiary
rule to include a separate standard for defendants attempting
to introduce reverse-Spreigl evidence.
The proposed rule retains the text of Minnesota's current
standard for admitting Spreigl evidence.194 To differentiate it
from the defendants' standard, "Spreigl Evidence Admissibility
Standard" should be added to the current title of Minnesota
Rule of Evidence 404(b). 19 5 The rule should be amended to include a second standard, numbered 404(c) 196 and titled "Reverse-Spreigl Admissibility Standard."
The text of the

192. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
193. This comparison suggests that in practice the standard for admitting
reverse-Spreigl evidence actually is higher than the standard established by
Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b). See supra notes 111-42 and accompanying
text.
194. See supra note 40 and accompanying text for Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b).
195. Its current title is "Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts." MINN. R. EVID.
404(b). The addition to the title should be inserted following the existing title
and preceded by a semicolon. The title change reflects the language used in
Minnesota case law to describe this rule. The amended title also provides a
context for the reverse-Spreigl admissibility standard.
196. Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404 formerly included a provision labeled
404(c), which dealt with defendants' past sexual conduct with victims. MINN.
R. EviD. 404. In 1990, the provision was renumbered Minnesota Rule of Evidence 412. Id.; see supra note 40. Twelve years have passed since that change
became effective. The renumbering brought the Minnesota Rules into conformity with the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. EVID. 412. Therefore,
numbering the reverse-Spreigl admissibility standard as Minnesota Rule of
Evidence 404(c) is unlikely to create confusion.
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amended rule should appear as follows: 197
Reverse-Spreigl Admissibility Standard. Any person charged with a
crime may introduce evidence which suggests that a third party,
rather than the defendant, committed the crime. Courts shall admit
such evidence if it is relevant pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Evidence
401.198 Courts, however, may exclude reverse-Spreigl evidence pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Evidence 403199 if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing the issues, misleading the jury, or creating undue delay.200 If appealed, any exclusion of reverse-Spreigl evidence shall receive de novo review.

This amended standard facilitates the introduction of reliable reverse-Spreigl evidence. The high standard developed in
State v. Spreigl functions to protect defendants from prejudice.
However, reverse-Spreigl evidence cannot prejudice defendants
because the evidence involves the conduct of third parties. By
lowering the standard for reverse-Spreigl evidence, the proposed rule reflects the fact that prejudice is not an issue in reverse-Spreigl cases. The amended rule safeguards defendants'
Sixth Amendment rights by providing them with a viable
means of introducing evidence showing that a third party
committed the crime at issue.
Even with the implementation of proposed Minnesota Rule
of Evidence 404(c), the relevancy requirement of Minnesota
Rule of Evidence 401 still ensures that defendants may only in20 1 If
troduce evidence with some bearing on the charged crime.
a defendant cannot produce evidence that makes it somewhat
more likely that the third party committed the charged crime
than it would be without the evidence, the trial judge should
exclude the reverse-Spreigl evidence. Under the proposed rule,
courts may exclude reverse-Spreigl evidence if the danger of
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, or creating undue de197. The Author generated this text based in part on a proposal for redrafting Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to include a separate standard for defendants. See Larsen, supra note 133, at 692-94.
198. "Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." MINN.
R. EviD. 401.
199. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." MINN. R. EVID.403.
200. This text omits the prejudice language from Minnesota Rule of Evidence 403 because third parties are not prejudiced by reverse-Spreigl evidence. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
201. See supra note 198.
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lay substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence.
This provision prevents defendants from hampering the proceeding by creating a smokescreen of useless and misleading
information. The de novo standard of review protects defendants from aggressive judicial use of the confusion and delay
exceptions. A judge who misconstrues reverse-Spreigl evidence
as duplicative, useless, or misleading is more likely to be overruled on appeal under a de novo standard of review.
CONCLUSION
Allowing defendants to introduce credible reverse-Spreigl
evidence improves Minnesota's criminal justice system. The
admission of such evidence allows the state to avoid false convictions and determine what actually occurred in charged
crimes. When courts admit reverse-Spreigl evidence, they
avoid punishing defendants for their inability to conduct an intensive investigation. Similarly, the state rejects the hypocrisy
of a system in which the prosecution, but not the defense, can
admit evidence of prior bad acts. Most importantly, when
courts admit such evidence, they uphold defendants' constitutional rights. Minnesota Rule of Evidence 404(b) should be
amended to ensure that defendants receive a fair opportunity
to admit reverse-Spreigl evidence. With such a change, Minnesota's criminal justice system may motivate other states, and
even the federal government, to evaluate the effect of their respective third party evidence rules on defendants' Sixth
Amendment rights.

